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T

HE question I want to discuss in this essay is whether the recognition
of human rights can survive secularization.1 By "secularization," I do
not mean anything subtle or complicated. On this occasion, I mean loss
of belief in God. My question is whether the recognition of human rights
can survive loss of belief in God.
There may be some readers who find my question seriously wrongheaded. We have all been told that the idea of human rights emerged
from the Enlightenment and that the Enlightenment was a secular, antiChristian movement. For those readers who believe this, the question is
not whether the recognition of human rights can survive the loss of belief
in God but whether it can survive the endurance of belief in God. I think
that by the end of the essay it will be clear that the right question really is
whether the recognition of human rights can survive secularization.
There is a good deal of disagreement and confusion concerning
rights in general and human rights in particular. Let us begin by explaining how I understand those. A right is always a right of X to the good of
being treated a certain way by Y. The good in question may be the good of
Y extending to X a certain benefit, or it may be the good of Y refraining
from interfering with X's performance of some action. An example of a

right to the former sort of good would be the right of a student to an "A"
on her record if she has done top-notch work in her course. An example

of a right to the latter sort of good would be one's right not to be molested
while walking in Central Park. Thus, rights are a special kind of normative
social relationship.
There are several ways of verbalizing that special kind of relationship.
For example, you have a right to the good of being treated a certain way
when you have a legitimate claim to being treated that way. Another way of
verbalizing it is that you have a right to the good of being treated a certain
1. The substance of this essay was delivered as the Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture at Villanova University School of Law on April 1, 2009. It is the
condensation of a line of thought whose parts are spread over several chapters in

my book, JUSTICE:

RIGHTS AND WRONGS 285-394 (2008).

(411)
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way when being treated that way is due you. Yet another way of verbalizing
it is that you have a right to the good of being treated a certain way when
you deserve to be so treated.
The shadow side of having a right to the good of being treated a certain way is that you are wronged if you are not treated that way. A person
is guilty if he fails to treat another as he ought to treat her. A person is
wronged if the other does not treat her as she has a right to be treated.
Though a right is always to the good of being treated a certain way,
the converse is not true: a way of being treated by another might be a good
thing in one's life without one's having a right to it. For example, in the
Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam there is a glorious painting by Rembrandt
called The Jewish Bride. I think it would be a great good in my life if the
Rijksmuseum donated that painting to me so I could hang it on my living
room wall. Sad to say, I do not have a right to the good of the museum's
doing that. A less fanciful example of the point is that if I have wronged
someone, it would be a good in my life if they forgave me. Nonetheless, I
do not have a right to that good because I am not wronged if they do not
forgive me.
The biggest challenge facing anyone who wants to develop a theory of
rights is to explain why it is that in certain cases one has a right to the
good of being treated a certain way, whereas in other cases one has no
such right-no such morally legitimate claim. 2 Rights are what respect
for worth requires. On the one hand, human beings have worth. On the
other hand, there are ways of treating one's fellow human beings that do
not befit their worth. You have a right to the good of being treated a
certain way by me in case I would not be treating you as befits your worth if
I did not treat you that way. If you have done top-notch work as a student
in a philosophy course that I am teaching, then the reason you have a
right to the good of receiving an "A" for the course is that my giving you
an "A" is what befits the worth you have acquired.
The dominant alternative to this view of rights, what respect for worth
requires, is the view that holds that rights are protectors of autonomy.
The main problem with this view is that though all human beings have
rights, not all are capable of autonomous action. I shall address this point
shortly infra.

That is enough about rights in general. Now, human rights. To possess a certain right, you must be of a certain sort. You have to have a
certain status. To have a right to the prize designated for the winner of the
New York City Marathon, you have to come in first and not have violated
any of the rules of the contest. A human right is then a right such that the
only status you have to possess to have the right is that of being a human
being. To have a right to the prize designated for the winner of the New
York Marathon you obviously have to be a particular kind of human being.
2. Let me give my answer to this question without, on this occasion, defending it. I defend this answer at some length in JusTIcE, supra note 1, at 285-310.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss3/1
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It is not enough just to be a human being. Therefore, that is not a human
right.
A human right, to recapitulate, is such that the only status you must
possess to have the right is that of being a human being. But you must be
a human being. Being a human being is not only sufficient but also necessary for possessing a human right. An important point to notice and keep
in mind here is that human rights are no more than a small subset of the
rights that human beings have. Often this point is overlooked in the literature. Having a right to the prize designated for the winner of the marathon is a right that a human being has but it is not a human right.
A word must also be said about naturalrights. Many of the rights we
possess accrue to us on account of some human action-a piece of legislation passed, a promise made, a rule laid down, and so forth. Such rights
are often called positive rights. A natural right is a non-positive right. It is
a right that one does not possess on account of some human action, or
does not possess only on account of some human action. If there should
ever be an international government that legislatively confers on every
human being certain rights, then there would be positive human rights.
As of now, there is no such government. So our topic is, perforce, natural
human rights.
Though some readers may never have read the various U.N. declarations on human rights, all should be aware of them. I regard these declarations as a great moral achievement. Paradoxically, the twentieth century
was a century of both great moral horror and great moral achievement.
The U.N. declarations are all dignity-based documents. All of them affirm
that human rights accrue to human beings on account of some dignity
that human beings possess, some worth. Given my account of rights, that
is exactly what I think they should say.
Worth does not just settle down on things willy-nilly. Things have
worth on account of something about them-some property, some capacity, some achievement, some relationship, or whatever. Their worth supervenes on something about them. You have the worth that merits an "A" in
my course because of the high quality of the work that you did in the
course. A striking feature of the U.N. documents is that though they affirm or assume that all human beings have dignity, they make no attempt
to specify what it is about human beings that gives them that dignity. They
make no attempt to specify the features of human beings on which the
relevant worth supervenes. This has been a point of criticism by some
Muslim writers. They see such silence as an indication that these documents emerged from a secularist mindset. From various histories of the
origin of these documents, we know, however, that that is not the reason
for the silence. The original authors discussed the basis of human dignity.
Nonetheless, they found themselves disagreeing on the matter and decided to remain silent.
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In the literature on human rights, there is a good deal of discussion
about what grounds human rights. This means that which gives each
human being worth, and hence the right to be treated in certain ways.
And that is the question that I now consider. The U.N. documents assume
that certain rights accrue to anybody who is a human being on account of
some worth that he or she has-some dignity. What is it about human
beings that accounts for that worth? On what features of human beings
does that dignity supervene?
Let us be clear about the sort of feature we are looking for. It must be
a feature that all human beings have. It must be a feature that non-human
beings do not have. And it has to be a feature that gives to each human
being a worth greater than that which any non-human animal has. No
matter how far in the scale of excellence a human being may drop, she will
still be of greater excellence than any animal. That is the idea.
To the best of my knowledge, all secular, non-theistic proposals concerning the ground of human rights that can be found in the literature
are what one might call capacity accounts. All of them suggest that the
worth in question supervenes on a certain capacity that human beings
have.3 There is a bit of variation as to the capacity proposed. Nonetheless, all of the proposals run into the same problems. Let us examine the
capacity that is by far most often cited, namely the capacity for rational
agency-the capacity to act for reasons and not just out of causes. The
idea goes back to Immanuel Kant.
The capacity for rational agency is indeed extraordinary, and it gives
worth deserving of great respect to those who possess it. But does this
capacity do the work required for grounding human rights? I think not.
Some of the higher mammals appear to possess this capacity. It is not
unique to human beings. But we are looking for a feature that is not only
shared by all human beings but also unique to human beings.
How might one get around this problem? One way would be to augment the capacity, so no animals have it. Some have suggested-in place
of the mere capacity for rational agency-the more complex capacity to
form, follow, and revise a plan of life. I think it safe to say that though
porpoises and chimpanzees have some capacity for rational agency, they
do not have this more complex capacity.
But now notice a difficulty from the opposite end: a good many
human beings do not have the capacity to form, follow, and revise a plan
of life. Alzheimer's patients do not have this capacity, nor do those suffering from severe brain injury, nor do those in a permanent coma. Is there
a way to get around this difficulty?
Well, one way to bring these impaired human beings into the circle of
human dignity would be to thin out the relation that must hold between
the human being and the capacity. Instead of saying that a being must
3. Alan Gewirth developed a capacities account that is not a dignity account.
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 325-40.

I discuss and critique his view in
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possess the property of having the capacity to form, follow, and revise a
plan of life, one could say that it must possess the property of having or
having had the capacity.

That gets people suffering from dementia into the circle of human
dignity. But what about infants? They do not possess this property. They
do not have the capacity to form, follow, and revise a plan of life. Furthermore, they did they have this capacity in the past. To get them in, we must
thin out the property even farther. Thus, a human being must possess the
property of having or having had the capacity to form, follow, and revise a
plan of life, or of being such that if it matures it will have the capacity.
That gets both Alzheimer's patients and well-formed infants into the
circle. But there are still some human beings who fall outside the circle of
dignity, namely those who are severely impaired mentally from birth. How
can we get them in? We have to thin out even further the relationship
between a being and the capacity to form, follow, and revise a life-plan.
Consider the following complicated property: the property of belonging
to a species such that maturation of its properly formed members includes
having the capacity to form, follow, and revise a life-plan.
Thus far, every human being does have this complicated property that
thins out the relation of the being to the capacity for forming, following,
and revising a life-plan, and no non-human being has this property. But
now two comments are in order. First, the property we have wound up
with is not a very impressive property. It is nowhere near as impressive as
the property with which we began: that of actually possessing the capacity
to form, follow, and revise a life-plan. Possessing this thinned-out property
does not give those who possess it very much worth. And second, some of
the higher animals possess a property that is considerably more impressive
than this thinned-out property, namely the property of actually having the
capacity to engage in rational agency.
My image of the problem here is that of a seesaw. We began by picking a certain admirable capacity of human beings and suggest that human
rights are grounded in possessing that capacity. Then we noticed that certain of the higher animals possess that capacity. Therefore, we augmented
the capacity until we were sure that no animals possess it. But then we
noticed that some human beings also do not possess this augmented property. Then, rather than saying that human beings must have the capacity
in order to possess the worth in question, we carefully crafted some complicated relation of human beings to the capacity such that every human
being does stand in that relationship to the capacity. But then it occurred
to us that the worth a human being possesses on account of having this
complicated, thinned-out relation to the capacity really does not come to
much. And we noticed that some of the higher animals possess a nobler
property than that one. It is a seesaw.
It is easy to see that the seesaw fate of this particular capacity proposal
will be the fate of every capacity proposal. No matter which capacity one
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
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selects, there will be some human beings who do not actually have the
capacity. If one then thins out the required relation of something to the
capacity, so that every human being stands in that relation to the capacity,
one is left with a property that does not give its possessor sufficient dignity
to ground human rights, and with a property such that some animals have
a more impressive property.
This leaves us with three basic options. One option is to give up on
capacity accounts and find a new and different way of grounding human
rights. A second option is to continue to insist that each human being has
a dignity sufficient for grounding human rights while conceding that
there are some human beings for whom one is at a loss to say what it is
about them that gives them that dignity.
The third option is to give up on the idea of human rights. Under
this option, one can then proceed in one of three ways. One can offer
utilitarian reasons for maintaining human rights practices while denying
that there really are any human rights. This was the position of Richard
Rorty, though it has to be said that Rorty was remarkably vague as to what
exactly is the social good that human rights practices effect. 4 Alterna-

tively, one can propose that we not only give up on the idea of human
rights but also give up on human rights practices while continuing to recognize the rights of those human beings who are capable of functioning as
full-fledged persons. Or one can scrap the idea of rights in general and
say goodbye to human rights practices.
Let me say something about the first of the main options, that of offering a non-capacity grounding for human rights. Notice that no matter
how impaired a human being may be, she retains human nature. Indeed,
the idea of an impairedhuman being presupposes the idea of human nature. It is by virtue of possessing human nature that one can be properly
formed or malformed in some respect-that one can function properly or
improperly. Alzheimer's patients who have lost all capacity for rational
agency are, on that account, malformed. They nonetheless retain human
nature. So might it be that, no matter how malformed a human being
may be, simply possessing human nature gives him or her a worth sufficient for grounding human rights? I am not aware of this proposal having
been put forward in the literature on human rights, but I think it is worth
considering. Of course, there are many writers nowadays who reject the
idea of a fixed human nature. For them, this proposal would be a nonstarter.
A good way to think about the issue is to regard our human nature as
our design-plan, and then to consider what we would say about other cases
of well-formed and malformed exemplifications of a design-plan. Suppose
that my two neighbors own examples of the same model of automobile.
4. See RiCHARD RORTY, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON
HuMAN RIGHTS: THE OxFoRD AMNESTY LECTURES 111, 111-34 (Stephen Shute and

Susa Hurley eds., 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss3/1

6

2009]

CA.-

Wolterstorff: Can Human Rights Survive Secularization

HuMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE SECULARIZATION?

417

The example that my neighbor to the east owns is well-formed in all respects, and I admire it enormously. The example that my neighbor to the
west owns is a "lemon," and the mechanics all tell him that to get it to run
properly would require such extensive replacement of parts that it is best
to scrap it.

Would I advise the latter neighbor to reject this advice and instead to
hold onto his automobile as something of great worth? Would I tell him
that the mechanics, in advising him to scrap it, are ignoring the fact that
his automobile is an example of the very same model whose well-formed
example is so admirable? Would I tell him that the automobile in his garage is truly admirable on account of its design-plan, even though nobody
can get it to run?
My guess is that readers would divide in how they answer this question. Suppose that, in spite of the fact that my neighbor's automobile is
inoperative, you would advise him to treat his automobile as something of
great worth on account of its design-plan. By analogy, you would then also
say that merely having human nature is sufficient to give a human being
worth. So suppose that is true. So far as I can see, the worth a human
being has on account of possessing human nature is less than the worth of
one of the higher animals on account of actually being able to engage in
some bit of rational action. So once again, we have a seesaw.
Consider this analogy: the inoperative car has some worth on account
of being an exemplar of a noble design-plan. But does not a car that runs
well but whose design plan is less noble have more worth? I know which of
the two I would choose if I were offered a choice; I would choose a wellrunning Ford over an inoperative BMW. I myself would not give an affirmative answer to the question posed above. Emphasizing the distinction between that abstract thing which is the design-plan, and this particular
concrete exemplar of the plan, I would insist that no matter how noble the
design-plan, this particular exemplar deserves nothing better than being
junked.
Thus, whichever answer one gives to the question about the worth of
having human nature, conclude, by analogy, that appealing to human nature instead of human capacities also does not yield an adequate secular
grounding of human rights. There is adequate secular grounding for the
rights of those human beings who have the capacity to form, follow, and
revise a life-plan, but not for those who are so severely impaired as to lack
the capacity for doing that. Of course, from the fact that there is at present no adequate secular grounding of human rights it does not follow
that there will never be one. It may seem unlikely that there ever will be.
But the history of philosophy is filled with strokes of genius.
I quite deliberately formulated the topic of my discussion-"Can
human rights survive secularization?"-so that it would carry two suggestions. The formulation was intended to suggest, in the first place, that the
origin of the recognition of human rights is not to be located in the proPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
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cess of secularization. We have all heard the story I alluded to earlier, that
the recognition of human rights first emerged in the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and that the Enlightenment was a secular, anti-Christian movement. To what extent the
Enlightenment was in fact secular remains a matter of controversy. I myself believe that it was considerably less secular and less anti-Christian than
is commonly supposed. In any case, what recent research quite clearly
shows is that it is not true that the recognition of human rights first
emerged in the Enlightenment.
The legal historian, John Witte, has shown that the early Protestant
5
Reformers employed the idea of human rights almost with abandon.
Two legal historians of the medieval period, Brian Tierney and Charles
Reid, have shown that the canon lawyers of the twelfth century did so as
well. 6 My own view is that if we ask, in turn, whether writers before the
twelfth century might have recognized the existence of human rights without explicitly conceptualizing them, what we discover is that human rights
were recognized by the Church Fathers, and back behind them, by the
writers of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. 7 I hold that the recognition of human rights is one of the great gifts of the Hebrew and Christian
Scriptures to humanity. 8
My formulation was intended to suggest, in the second place, that
there is available a non-secular, theistic grounding of human rights. Let
me briefly describe such a grounding. 9 It has to be based on some relation to God that does not presuppose any particular set of capacities. Of
course, to point out that theism of a certain sort has the resources for
grounding human rights is not to establish the truth of that or any other
version of theism, just as pointing out that Kantianism has the resources
for grounding the rights of those human beings who are capable of functioning as persons is not to establish the truth of Kantianism.
Theologians often say that our shared and ineradicable dignity as
human beings supervenes on our bearing the image of God, the imago dei.
To decide whether this answer is correct, we must know what is understood by the imago dei. Some writers understand the imago as consisting of
resembling God with respect to certain capacities. Others understand it as
consisting of resembling God with respect to a certain role in creation that
10
the capacities enable-the role of "having dominion," for example.
5. SeeJOHN WITrE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS (2007).
6. See CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY
(2004); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1997).
7. I defend this thesis in JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 59-131.
8. I defend this thesis in chapters three through five of JUSTICE, supra note 1,
at 65-131.
9. I develop the theistic account much more fully than I do here in JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 342-61.
10. For a more extensive discussion of the imago dei, see generally JAMES BARR,
BIBLICAL FAITH AND NATURAL THEOLOGY: THE GIFFORD LECTURES FOR 1991 DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH (1993).
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The points already made concerning secular attempts to ground
human rights apply here as well. Thus, whatever capacities a theologian
might single out as the basis for the imago dei, some human beings do not
have those capacities. Some do not yet have them, some no longer have
them, and some never will have them. But if a given human being does
not possess those capacities, then of course she does not resemble God
with respect to possessing them. And if she does not possess them, then
also she does not resemble God with respect to the role in creation that
those capacities enable. If the imago dei is understood in such a way as to
consist of resembling God with respect to certain capacities or with respect
to some role that requires certain capacities, then there are human beings
who lack the imago dei. Most Christian theologians would find the conclusion that some human beings lack the imago dei unacceptable.
The only way to avoid it is to make the same sort of move that I made
when winding up my discussion of secular accounts of human rights.
Thus, we must move from thinking of the imago dei as consisting of resembling God with respect to certain capacities or some role that requires
certain capacities, to thinking of it as resembling God on account of one's
human nature. No matter how seriously impaired a human being may be,
she nonetheless possesses human nature. The resemblance will have to be
somewhat roundabout: resembling God in having a nature such that those
in whom it is properly functioning possess those God-like capacities that
traditional accounts of the imago dei highlighted.
The skepticism that I expressed earlier, concerning whether merely
possessing human nature gives one the worth that grounds human rights,
is obviously appropriate here as well. Thus, a theistic account of human
rights, to be adequate, cannot merely appeal to the resemblance to God
that possessing human nature provides. It will have to appeal to some
additional relationship to God possessed by all those who bear the imago
dei thus understood-a relationship that imparts to them the requisite dignity without presupposing any capacities on their part.
What might such a relationship be? One candidate is the relationship
to God of being redemptively loved by God permanently and equally with
all other human beings. Severely impaired human beings can stand in this
relationship along with those who are not impaired. And a creature that
stands in this relationship to God does, on that account, have great worth.
I have argued that there is no adequate secular grounding of human
rights in general. And let me say one last time that by "human rights in
general" I mean not only the rights of those human beings who have the
capacities necessary for forming, following, and revising a life-plan but also
the rights of those who do not have such capacities. I have also presented
the outlines of a theistic grounding of human rights that seems to me
adequate. When one puts these two theses together, I think it is almost
impossible not to ask oneself the question, can the recognition of human
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rights in general survive secularization? That is, can it survive erosion of
belief in God?
A thesis prominent in twentieth century sociology has been that modernization leads to secularization. I am told that most sociologists have
now given up on the thesis. Though the United States is as highly modernized a society as any, evidence suggests that belief in God is at least as
prominent among Americans now as it was two centuries ago. But suppose that secularization does happen; suppose that belief in God does
erode. Would the recognition of the rights-grounding dignity of those
human beings who are severely impaired survive? Affirming the dignity of
each human being is compatible with not being able to account for their
dignity. But what should we expect to happen, not immediately but over
the long haul, if a sizable proportion of our citizenry have no way of accounting for their dignity? I am not a prophet and do not know. But I do
think it is appropriate to worry about moral erosion at this point.
Given that we live in a participatory democracy, it would be highly
desirable to have an adequate grounding of human rights that all of us
could embrace, no matter what our religious or non-religious orientation.
Second best would be one or more adequate groundings such that everybody could accept at least one of these. So far as I can see, neither of
these is our situation. Our situation is that whereas there is available a
theistic account that grounds the rights of all human beings, a comparable
secular account is not available. I do not find this situation appealingnot at all. But I have come to think that it is in fact our situation.
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